The University and Free Speech by Grcic, Joseph
 
 
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XVI, 2014, 1, pp. 675-684 
675 
 
The University and Free Speech 
 
 
Joseph Grcic 
Indiana State University 
Philosophy Department 
Joseph.Grcic@indstate.edu 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Free speech is a necessary condition for the growth of knowledge and the implementation of 
real and rational democracy. Educational institutions play a central role in socializing 
individuals to function within their society. Academic freedom is the right to free speech in the 
context of the university and tenure, properly interpreted, is a necessary component of 
protecting academic freedom and free speech. 
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A complete discussion of free speech must consist of five distinct aspects: definition, 
history, justification, relation and implementation.  Definition, of course, is central 
for specifying the exact nature of the concept under discussion, ideally giving 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of the concept.  The historical aspect 
is simply a survey of the temporal evolution of the concept; this usually provides 
suggestions for its justification.  Justification refers to the arguments or reasons 
necessary to rationally assent to the validity of the alleged right, which, in 
normative discourse is usually made in terms of some moral theory from which the 
right is presumably entailed.  The notion of relation concerns the role the right 
under discussion plays with respect to other rights or moral categories. Finally, 
implementation addresses the problem of the proper institutional or legal structures 
necessary to apply and protect the right in actual social circumstances.  Let us 
consider these questions in turn.  
As a first approximation, the right to free speech will be defined here as a right 
that others refrain from restricting the content of speech.  That is, there is no idea or 
opinion that is forbidden by law. In addition, there must be no limit on the scope of 
speech, i.e., no restriction on the size, timing or location of the potential audience. 
This first approximation which presents the right to free speech as absolute and 
totally unrestricted is modified when its relation to other rights and interests is 
brought into the discussion.  It will be assumed that free speech can be limited in 
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order to prevent harm to others. Traditional examples of justified limits on speech 
include such cases as falsely yelling “fire” in a theater, libel, to protect minors, as 
against pornography, etc.  
Historically, the right to free speech has had a long if checkered career.  It’s 
origins probably go back to Socrates’ defense of the freedom of thought in Plato’s 
Apology.   There, Socrates argued, among other things, that he had a higher duty to 
the gods to pursue knowledge which he believed would ultimately benefit Athens as 
well benefit him. Liberal thinkers such as Locke and later Mill use various 
arguments to justify free speech as a human right.  However, it is generally agreed 
that special protection for the right to free speech for faculty members as academic 
freedom (see below) was first fully implemented in Germany in the nineteenth 
century.   
For our purposes, the justification of the right to free speech can be based on 
the necessary conditions for the growth of knowledge and the nature of democracy.  
This justification can be made in utilitarian or non-utilitarian terms.  A 
non-utilitarian defense of free speech grounds it in some conception of individual 
autonomy and dignity.  A utilitarian approach such as that of J. S. Mill views free 
speech as a necessary condition for the rational growth of knowledge.l  Mill argued 
that only if all individuals can criticize existing beliefs and propose new ones can 
knowledge increase.   
Free speech is also a necessary condition for democracy.  For persons to 
rationally choose their representatives, they must have access to the most complete 
and objective information, especially if political power is to be distributed by the 
informed  consent of the governed. Without the right to free speech, political power 
could not be acquired in a competitive and rational manner, nor would the 
electorate be able to hold accountable individuals who already possess political 
power.  The right to free speech, then, has a double foundation: as a necessary 
condition for rationality and the growth of knowledge, and for the maintenance of a 
democratic government.   
The right to free speech, like any other crucial right, must have an institutional 
implementation.  That is, it must have social structures that define and interpret it 
(e.g. courts), expand and publicize it (e.g. the press), as well as promote and nourish 
it (e.g. educational institutions).  Educational institutions perform at least four 
central functions in a democratic society: the socialization (inculcating of the 
community’s beliefs values and customs) of new members, the training and 
certification for the various roles and professions, the development of individual 
potential and knowledge and the development of a critical perspective.  That is, in a 
democratic society, educational institutions do not merely passively transmit the 
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existing beliefs and values but also seek to evaluate and criticize them and to 
promote the development of more adequate ideas and a more rational society.2   
It is assumed here that rationality is a desirable trait for any society to have, 
but it is especially desirable in a democracy.  Rationality is desirable, first, in that it 
means partly to take the most appropriate means to achieve the given goals 
(instrumental reason).  This sense of rationality would seem to be of cross-cultural 
value.  The other aspect of rationality involves a general critical attitude and 
questioning of means and ends.  A community that accepts both aspects of 
rationality should be called an ‘open society’ or one based on free inquiry.  Such a 
society is typified by the assumption that no society is perfect in knowledge or 
moral virtue and that this fallibility and imperfection are corrigible by rational 
inquiry and criticism.3  Some communities, however, may be typified by obtaining 
and maintaining beliefs by appeal to what they consider a sacred and infallible 
person, or text, or tradition.  These communities would value rationality in its 
instrumental dimension (means-ends) but not in its overall critical dimension. The 
question of academic freedom is relevant only in a society that accepts rationality in 
both senses.  
The institutionalization of the promotion and development of free speech and 
free inquiry occurs primarily in the context of educational institutions.  The 
socializing and training function is performed at every level of education, but the 
development of the critical attitude, which is necessary for an open and free society, 
is primarily performed at the college and university level.  Because of the knowledge 
of the faculty and their role as educators of new generations, institutions of higher 
learning are the logical loci of systematic and open inquiry and of the initiation of 
social reform.  To be sure, not all colleges and universities have the overriding 
dedication to the pursuit of knowledge; some are committed to political, religious or 
other ideologies in a dogmatic or noncriticizable way.  Undoubtedly, such 
institutions have a right to exist in a free society, but if all educational institutions 
were of this type, a free society would cease to be free.  
Open and free inquiry in academia has traditionally been protected by the 
development of what is termed “academic freedom.”  Academic freedom means that 
tenured professors cannot be terminated or penalized in any way for exercising their 
right to free speech and inquiry, inside or outside the college (including research, 
teaching and publication). This is a privilege distinct from the general civil right to 
free speech that citizens of a democracy have, since other citizens working in the 
private sector may be legally fired or penalized in some way for expressing opinions 
displeasing to their employers.  A direct implication of this understanding of 
academic freedom is that decisions concerning an academic’s work can only be made 
on the basis of competence as understood in that profession, not whether one agrees 
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or disagrees with his or her ideas.  If agreement were a condition for hiring, tenure 
and promotion, new ideas and free inquiry would be stifled.  Decisions concerning 
the appointment, tenure and promotion of professors must be made by their peers; 
peer evaluation is crucial if authority over academics is to be exercised in a manner 
consistent with free inquiry and the growth of knowledge.  However, as it exists 
presently, only ‘tenured’ professors have this protection: let us consider this concept 
of tenure.  
Academic freedom has been institutionalized through the practice of tenure.  
Tenure means that once a teacher has served a probationary period (usually no 
more than seven years), he or she is granted guaranteed employment until 
retirement and can be dismissed only for failing to perform specified duties, or for 
moral turpitude, for financial exigencies which require the elimination of a tenure 
slot in the department, or because of the elimination of the department itself. The 
idea of tenure is related to the nature of the responsibilities of professors.  These 
responsibilities include the function of socialization, professional training, the 
development of critical reason (teaching), and the growth of knowledge (research), 
as well as the support and maintenance of the educational institution itself (service). 
Hence, tenure has been usually decided by determining to what extent one has 
successfully promoted the goals of teaching, research and service to the university.  
The American Association of University Professors also claims that tenure serves 
the purpose of providing economic security which in turn will attract qualified 
individuals to the profession.4 Academic freedom, then consists of three essential 
concepts: the commitment of educational institutions to the pursuit of knowledge 
per se (not the propagation of some dogma or ideology), the exercise of authority 
over academics must be only by peers, and the security against termination or 
tenure.  
Though the theory of tenure as sketched above may not seem obviously 
problematic, in practice, several problems seem to have emerged.5  Firstly, tenure 
does not protect junior faculty during their probationary period.  This is a 
significant factor for it seems plausible that junior faculty are at least as likely and 
probably more so to introduce new and unpopular ideas than older and more 
established colleagues.  However, since untenured faculty usually seek to achieve 
tenure there will be a tendency to avoid controversial issues that might alienate and 
antagonize older members of the department who will later make the tenure 
decision. Consequently, the present system of tenure may filter out the very 
individuals and ideas it was meant to protect.  In addition, it creates a high level of 
anxiety in junior faculty who must function at their best under this same stress.  
Secondly, the brief probationary period puts pressure on individuals to publish 
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quickly and in quantity which may reduce the quality of the publications.  Thirdly, 
once a professor has been denied tenure, universities usually do not help in finding 
alternate employment.  Fourthly, to the extent the present system under protects 
junior faculty it may overprotect the tenured faculty in the following way.  In 
theory, tenured professors can be terminated for failing to adequately carry out 
their duties, but in practice, the present system allows individuals to continue 
teaching while meeting only minimal standards of competence.  This is the problem 
of so-called “deadwood” which many feel exists because of the difficulty of 
removing individuals who are tenured because the security of guaranteed 
employment removes incentives for a high level of performance.  Tenure also 
reduces the financial and academic flexibility of colleges and universities since it is 
difficult to terminate individuals for economic reasons or for reasons of new staffing 
and teaching needs.6  
Some have argued for the abolition of tenure and its replacement with a system 
of renewable contracts.7  This would involve the right to due process by peers with 
the burden of proof not to renew a contract resting with the institution.  Contracts 
could not be denied renewal if it meant the violation of academic freedom.  In 
addition, contracts must specify the exact terms of employment and conditions for 
renewal.  
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This proposal is problematic for several reasons.  First, the theory of 
the present system of tenure does not preclude the termination of any 
individual who is failing to perform his or her duties, whether teaching, 
research or service.  Short of termination, of course, other measures can be 
used to provide incentives for better performance, measures such as raises, 
promotions, sabbaticals, and course load variations.  More importantly, one 
must ask “Incentives for what?”  To amass a long bibliography of mediocre 
value or to publish only if one has something of importance to say?  True, 
in the past there may have been a reluctance on the part of universities to 
terminate professors, but this is an institutional weakness, not an intrinsic 
problem with tenure.8  Tenure will not be abused if steps are taken by 
faculty, administration and students to protect their rights and ensure that 
teachers live up to their responsibilities.  All teachers should have their 
teaching evaluated on a regular basis by peers and students.  Professors 
who are strong in teaching but weak in publications should have their 
teaching schedule reflect this, and conversely for strong researchers who are 
weak teachers.  All professors should also be encouraged to participate in 
paid summer institutes on a regular basis to keep abreast of developments 
in their field.  
The renewable contract idea would at the very least have a chilling 
effect on professors’ speech and research.  All forms of subtle pressure could 
be used by the administration and faculty to remove someone with whom 
they are uncomfortable or for financial reasons.  In addition, a flood of 
costly litigation would likely result from non-renewed professors.  Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, there is the possibility of conflict of interest 
given that all faculty would be equally nontenured.  When a colleague came 
up for renewal there may be a tendency to be lenient since this would 
increase the chances of one’s own renewal in the future.  In the tenure 
system which exists today at most schools, tenured faculty do not have 
reasons to be lax on junior faculty, in fact, quite the contrary may often 
occur.9  
A related argument contends that professors should not be singled out 
for the special protection that tenure provides, but employee rights for all 
should be expanded.  On this view, all employees should have expanded 
rights in the workplace including the right to due process if disciplinary 
action or discharge is recommended.  This means the employer must specify 
a just cause for terminating or penalizing an employee, base promotions 
and raises on public and fairly applied standards, and uphold employee 
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rights.  These rights involve, in addition to the right to due process, the 
right to “blow the whistle” or go public with immoral or illegal company 
activities, the right to privacy, and the right to strike.10   It may well be 
true that all employee rights should be extended, yet this point ignores the 
special status of the teaching profession. The academic profession is, in a 
sense, a foundational profession in that all other professions depend on it 
for their training and education.  It is foundational in the sense that it helps 
to inculcate through the process of socialization the basic or foundational 
values of democracy.  As such, it seems clear that the excellences of the 
teaching profession in terms of teacher skills, liberties and moral integrity 
would permeate the breadth of society. Consequently, a lack of 
independence on the part of teachers would contaminate with dogmatism 
and stagnation the entire gamut of educational and professional training 
and cultural life.  
As suggested above teachers play a pivotal role in the preservation of 
liberal democracy a role which, say, plumbers and bus drivers do not. 
Furthermore, though the right to “blow the whistle” is an important right 
that should be protected, it is not clear that a private corporation should 
tolerate free speech to the degree of allowing an employee to publicly insult, 
ridicule and denigrate his own employer and his products or services and 
advocate those of a competitor.  The general consideration that suggests 
itself here is whether the behavior of the employee is consistent with the 
assigned function of the employee.  That is, it seems one cannot have the 
most extensive set of rights in the workplace, since this may conflict with 
efficiency or adequate job performance.11  
However, in academia there is no conflict between freedom and 
efficiency since freedom is precisely one of the goals and defining 
characteristics of the professor.  It is this type of wide-ranging freedom and 
independence that tenure guarantees and that the academic profession 
needs if it is to be capable of criticizing the status quo.  In most cases, the 
function of the non-academic individual is more narrowly defined as 
performing a certain task within a corporate structure, whereas the 
academic’s role is not fully defined within the narrow confines of his or her 
institutional affiliation but involves the role of critic in the larger context of 
the society itself.  Just as judges must be independent of political pressures 
in order to decide cases fairly, so professors must be independent of 
political, economic and administrative control.  It is this role which gives 
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academics special status that merits special protection which tenure, 
properly applied, provides.  Again, this is not to suggest that non-academic 
employees should not have greater rights in the workplace, for they should.  
The point has been to define their different roles and functions from which 
flow differential rights and duties.  
 The problem of junior or non-tenured faculty must be addressed if 
tenure is not to be used as a reward for timid conformists.  To deal with this 
problem, some have suggested that junior faculty not be terminated for 
exercising their right to express new and perhaps unpopular ideas.  The 
institutionalizing of due process for these professors would protect their 
freedom, if they are competent, of course.l2  This does not mean that junior 
faculty should have tenure from the start, but it does mean that they 
cannot be terminated for reasons tenure is meant to guard against.  Since a 
probationary period seems to be necessary to evaluate the competence of 
new employees, junior faculty cannot have the same protection as senior 
faculty since the idea of tenure is to protect those who can best perform the 
function of a teacher, education and criticism; to give it to others would be 
detrimental to the advancement of these basic purposes.13  
The argument presented here has been in terms of the social and 
institutional structures necessary to maximize freedom and knowledge.  In 
order for elections to be rational and government to be accountable, 
democracy requires free speech and a properly socialized new generation 
that is rational and critical.  Free speech and knowledge are maximized if 
those most knowledgeable have the freedom of free inquiry without fear of 
reprisal. Teachers and professors are in the vanguard of scientific, cultural 
and political progress through their own field-related research, teaching 
(socializing students to think critically and rationally), and general role as 
social critics.  This vocation can be fulfilled only if professors can question 
every aspect of the status quo, whether it concerns the university, the 
profession, the community or the political system as a whole.  Tenure, 
properly understood, protects teachers in their performance of these 
functions and thus preserves an open and free society.  
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